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Non-technical summary
Joint ventures between firms as part of innovation projects can be seen as a
strategy to deal with market failure and other insufficiencies of technology
markets. It is the objective of this paper to examine empirically the occurrence and
significance of types of joint ventures between innovative companies, customers
and suppliers within the German industry. The analysis is based on a written
survey of 3.122 enterprises, carried out by ZEW in 1994. The most important
results can be summarized as follows:
− 84% of those surveyed state that as part of innovation projects they cooperated
either with customers or suppliers or both. This percentage is even higher
(99%), when only companies with a formal R&D department were taken into
account.
− „Informal exchange of technical knowledge“is regarded to be the most
significant form of cooperation between innovative firms, customers and
suppliers, followed by formal types such as „joint development teams“ and
„R&D-cooperation by contract agreement“. „Joint ventures“and „R&D orders“
on the other hand are regarded as the least important types of cooperation.
− The occurrence and significance of different types of vertical cooperation
between innovative firms, customers and suppliers vary from one industry to the
other.
− The different forms of vertical cooperation can - in accordance with multi-
variate statistical methods - be reduced to two subgroups: While one subgroup
includes formal cooperation types, the other group includes informal types of
cooperation. The latter form of cooperation is of more importance to those
surveyed than the former.
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Abstract:
The surge in interfirm cooperative agreements can be seen as expressing a way for
firms to respond to and to organize market failure, especially in technology
markets. The incentives of firms to internalize activities are to avoid the
disadvantages, or capitalize on the advantages, of imperfections or disequilibria in
external mechanisms of resource allocations. The purpose of this paper is to
investigate empirically the occurrence and importance of different modes of
vertical relations between innovating firms, suppliers and users, using data from
Germany. The analysis is based on a survey conducted by the "Center for
European Economic Research" (Mannheim, Germany) among 3122 firms
representing 378 different lines of business, mainly in the manufacturing sector.
The main results can be summarized as follows:
• 84 % of all innovating firms responded that they have had R&D cooperation
agreements with either suppliers or customers or both. This percentage is even
higher (99 %) if we consider only those innovating firms that have also had
formal R&D departments. The phenomenon of vertical R&D cooperation is
therefore widespread among German firms.
• Informal exchange of technical knowledge was perceived as the most important
mode of R&D cooperation between innovating firms on one hand and customers
and suppliers on the other, followed by formal methods of cooperation such as
joint development teams and contractual R&D cooperation. Joint ventures and
direct R&D orders to either customers or suppliers were seen as the least
important modes of vertical cooperation.
• The occurrence and importance of cooperative agreements between innovating
firms, users and input suppliers vary across industries.
• Results of multivariate statistical analysis (correlation, principal components
and cluster analysis) suggested that the various modes of R&D cooperation
between innovating firms on one hand and customers and suppliers on the other
could be reduced to two subgroups: the first one includes formal modes of
cooperation, the second one includes only informal exchange of technical
knowledge. On this basis patterns of cooperative agreements could be
established for firms operating in different industries and for firms using
different product and process technologies.
Acknowledgment:
This paper was written while I was visiting scholar at the "Zentrum für Europäische
Wirtschaftsforschung" (ZEW), Mannheim. Financial support is gratefully acknowledged. I thank
Georg Licht and Marian Beise for helpful comments. Thanks are also extended to Wolfgang
Schnell, Harald Stahl and Stefan Kuck for their help in preparing the data base.

11 Introduction
A great deal of intellectual and political energy has been spent around the issue of
horizontal R&D cooperation between firms. Politicians both at national and
regional level propagate this idea as an important part of their national and regional
technology policy1. This political debate has been preceded and accompanied by
extensive economic research on the question of the importance of horizontal R&D
cooperation for innovative activities and international competitiveness of firms,
industries and nations (or blocks of nations). This research has highlighted  the
benefits and costs of policies aimed at enhancing horizontal R&D cooperation
between firms.
The expected main benefits of such policies are: (i) overcoming R&D financial
constraints of individual firms (costly research projects can be realized due to cost-
sharing); (ii) exploitation of economics of scale and scope in R&D; (iii) reduction
of wasteful duplication in R&D; (iv) internalization of technological spillovers and
other forms of externalities2; (v) better use of synergies due the fact that each firm
can contribute distinct capabilities to a common research project; and finally,
reduction of investment risks due to demand uncertainties. In short, horizontal R&D
cooperation has been seen as a panacea for solving important aspects of market
failures and other deficiencies in technology markets (for a survey of the literature
on this subject see Katz/Ordover 1990, Geroski 1995)3.
Policies aimed at enhancing horizontal R&D cooperation between firms through
government subsidies are, however,  in practice problematic: they create costs for
the economy at large. The major problem with these policies is that " ... they can
                                          
1 For Europe see, for instance, Commission of European Communities (1993) "White Paper" and
the Cecchini Report (1988).
2 In addition to technological spillovers, two other externalities have been featured prominently in
the literature: pecuniary externalities and environmental externalities. The former "arise when
the actions of some firm i  directly affect the competitive position or profits of one of ist rivals,
j. They occur when an action by i directly affects j’s costs or the damand  which it faces, or
when  R&D undertaken by firm i retards or blocks the innovative efforts of j. Some pecuniary
externalities are positive (e.g. those arising from risk-sharing), while others are negative (pre-
emptive R&D can prevent rivals from realizing a positive return on their R&D). Environmental
externalities occur when the actions of firm i affects the attitudes or expectations of j in a way
which affects how it reacts to i’s actions. A classic example of this type of externality arises
when cooperation between firms in one line of activity (say, in R&D) affects their willingness
and ability to cooperate in other lines of activity (say, in pricing)." (Geroski 1993 :59)
3 For individual country studies on R&D cooperation see König/Licht/Staat (1993) and Licht
(1994) for Germany, Kleinknecht/Reijnen (1992) for the Netherlands, Arvanitis et al. (1995) for
Switzerland.
2undermine incentives to conduct R&D (and other) operations efficiently, and may
lead to cozy pricing arrangements for the products embodying that R&D. What is
more, while monopolists may have the resources and opportunities to innovate, they
lack the incentives to do whenever the innovation threatens to displace any of their
existing activities. In a sense, these horizontal strategies set one type of market
failure against another, and it is not surprising that a "cure" of this type has some
side effects. Broadly speaking, the empirical evidence can be read as suggesting that
such strategies do not often work very well. Innovation is almost a product of active
rivalry, frequently occurring simultaneously with waves of entry" (Geroski
1995:140).
All these reservations regarding the efficacy of horizontal collusion - either it can
lead to the exploitation of market power or it may simply be misdirected, or both -
have led different scholars to advocate an alternative policy. This policy should be
aimed at enhancing vertical relations between innovating firms on one hand and
suppliers and users of innovations on the other. Such a policy would be based on
the theoretical insight and empirical evidence that innovation often requires
coordination between those agents that are operating at different stages of  the
innovation process, that is between innovation producers, innovation users and
input suppliers.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate empirically the occurrence and
importance of different modes of vertical relations between innovating firms, users
and suppliers, using data from Germany.4 The paper proceeds in three steps. I start
in section 2 by reviewing the motivations of innovating firms to embark on different
modes of vertical R&D cooperation with either suppliers or customers or both. In
section 3 I present briefly the data and the related results. I conclude with a brief
summary of the paper, some reflections on the results and a few brief observations
on the implications they carry for public policy towards vertical R&D cooperation
between firms (section 4).
2 Vertical Relations Between Firms and Innovation: Theoretical
Background
In this section two questions will be asked: first, why innovating firms seek to
cooperate with input suppliers and product users; second, what is the economic
rationale behind the choice of different modes of cooperation. In order to answer the
first question I will be looking at the body of theoretical and empirical industrial
                                          
4 In an upcoming paper I will be looking at the effects of vertical relations on the R&D Intensity
of innovating firms, using the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP) data for Germany.
3organization literature concerning the economics of technological innovation.5 For
the second question I will be using the insights of transaction costs economics.6 The
theoretical perspective that would help us to explain the reasons behind vertical
relations between innovating firms, suppliers and customers and those behind the
choice of different modes of vertical relations is what is now called "the New
Industrial Economics."7
2.1 Reasons for Vertical Relations Between Innovating Firms, Suppliers and
Customers
In the most general terms, private profit-seeking agents will plausibly allocate
resources to the exploration and development of new products and new techniques
of production if they know, or believe in, the existence of some sort of yet
unexploited scientific and technological opportunities; if they expect that there will
be a market for their new products and processes, and, finally, if they expect some
economic benefits, net of the incurred costs, deriving from the innovations. These
three major determinants of technological innovations mentioned here are
summarized in the literature under the headings of "technological opportunities",
"appropriability conditions" and "market demand". In other words, technological
innovations, like many other economic phenomena, are determined both by supply
factors (the first two factors) and by demand factors.
In contrast with the perceived tendency of the competitive market to achieve static
efficiency, it is generally agreed among economic theorists that the market
mechanism is likely to fall short of optimality in innovation. Many analysts
                                          
5 For the theory see Tirole 1988, for a survey of the empirical literature see Dosi (1988),
Cohen/Levin (1989) and Cohen (1995)
6 See Coase (1937), Williamson (1975, 1985 and 1989).
7 Of course, there are other theoretical traditions, especially in the management science literature,
that one may pursue for looking at the issues discussed here: First, the "Resource-Dependency"
approach (see Pfeffer/Nowack 1976); second, the "Exchange-theoretic" approach developed by
Thibaut and Kelley (see Anderson/Narus 1990 and Schrader 1990); third, the "strategic
behavior" approach, or (fourth) the "organizational knowledge and learning" approach (for a
brief survey of the last two approaches regarding  the explanation of joint ventures see Kogut
1988). In addition, the different theoretical approaches have different  units of analysis:
transaction costs economics looks at single transactions, industrial economics analyses firms
and industries, exchange theoretic approaches looks at single persons (see the various papers by
Schrader), while some management science scholars look at functional firm divisions (for a
recent empirical study in the last tradition see Kirchmann 1994).
4conclude that there is a propensity to underinvestment in R&D (see, e.g., Katz
1986:527-528)8, first because spillovers mean that a substantial proportion of the
benefits of an innovation are apt to go to an entity other than the one that bore its
cost - and benefits may even flow to the innovator’s competitors. Second, even in
the absence of externalities, the innovator will not capture all the benefits if it
cannot achieve perfect price discrimination, since the innovation will then enhance
consumers´ surplus. Third, imperfect information impedes sale of the rights to an
innovation at its full value because it ´... is hard to evaluate before it is transferred
from the buyer to the seller, and information that has been "loaned" to the buyer for
evaluation is difficult to recover’ (Katz 1986:528). In other words, this third
problem "refers to the difficulties that buyers have in trying to value an innovation,
and that sellers have in helping them without giving away crucial secrets. As
knowledge is a public good, any successful sale automatically creates potential
competition for the original seller, since the seller and the first buyer are both
capable of selling to a second buyer, and so on." (Geroski 1992: 139).
All these problems - appropriability problem, imperfect price discrimination,
imperfect information and the related problems of demand valuation and resale -
may cause market failure in technology markets. Since innovating firms cannot
always rely on market forces to solve their problems, they seek ad hoc nonmarket
solutions, such as cooperative agreements with other firms, specially those between
them on one hand and suppliers and customers on the other. "The surge of interfirm
agreements cannot be seen as expressing an improvement in the efficiency of
markets, or a reassertion of their effectiveness, but on the contrary represents the
full emergence of a new way for firms to respond to and to organize market failure.
The incentives of firms to internalize activities ... ‘are to avoid the disadvantages, or
capitalize on the advantages, of imperfections or disequilibria in external
mechanisms of resource allocations’"(Chesnais 1988:83).
Since cooperative agreements between innovating firms on one hand and suppliers
and users on the other affect the supply and demand facing them, they thus
influence major forces behind the innovation process. One of these major forces is
the issue of how innovators solve the "appropriability problem". Consequently, a
major motivation for innovating firms to seek R&D cooperation with input
suppliers and users is the expectation to solve this problem"9. Problems of
                                          
8 However, see Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) for a case in which firms have an incentive to
overinvest in R&D.
9 Classic discussion of the appropriability problem includes Arrow (1962) and Hirschleifer
(1971). In addition to R&D cooperation between innovating firms, suppliers and customers,
there are other solutions to the appropriability problem: government subsidies; horizontal R&D
cooperation between innovating firms, fostering of national champions in key technology areas;
strengthening the patents system (see, for instance, Geroski (1995)).
5appropriability affect both the amount of R&D that firms undertake and the location
of innovation. In both cases, vertical cooperation between innovating firms,
suppliers and users plays an important role.
With respect to the first case - appropriability conditions affecting the amount of
R&D - the following observations can be made: At base, the problem of
appropriability is that innovators are not protected by sufficiently high barriers to
entry, very often even in the presence of patents or other intellectual property rights
(see Cohen 1995, Harabi 1995b), to insure that they get a reasonable return for their
R&D efforts. If , however, a technological innovation must be packaged with other
assets to be commercially successful (such as specialized inputs, manufacturing or
marketing capabilities, see Teece 1986), then any artificially created shortages in
the supply of critical complementary assets effectively acts as a barrier to entry into
the market where the packaged technological innovation is sold. This, in turn,
allows the innovator to reap monopoly profits in that market to use in setting against
the costs of its R&D program. The innovator can gain control over the supply of
critical complementary assets through vertical cooperation with other firms or
through vertical integration of firms providing those complementary assets.10
Turning to the second case of how problems of appropriability can affect the
location of innovation, one can point to the following mechanism: If the returns of
new knowledge are difficult to appropriate, then it is likely to be the case to be
embodied in output if an innovator is to realize any revenue. According to von
Hippel (1982) two hypotheses follow from this observation. First, independent
innovators (for instance independent R&D labs) are less likely to innovate than
agents operating in the value chain involving the innovation (as suppliers,
manufacturers or users of the innovation) because they have only non-embodied
knowledge to sell. Second, differences in the ability of different agents in the value
chain to appropriate the rewards of innovation may give rise to incentives to
innovate which translate into systematic differences in the functional source of
innovation (i.e. whether it is user, supplier or manufacturer led). This second
hypothesis is consistent with evidence suggesting that users play a major role in the
innovative process in some sectors, while manufacturers (or suppliers) play a major
role in others (see von Hippel, 1976 and 1978). Von Hippel, for example, examined
111 basic, major and minor innovations in four families of scientific instruments,
and discovered that users dominated the innovation process in about 80% of the
sample innovations. The users perceived the need for a new instrument, invented it,
built and applied the prototype, and spread knowledge about it. Manufacturers
mainly performed product engineering work to improve manufacturability. Other
                                          
10 For a discussion of these issues, see Perry (1989),Thorelli (1986), Monteverde and Teece
(1982), Kogut (1988), Klein et al. (1978), Ayal and Izraeli (1990)
6researchers have emphasized the crucial role of users and suppliers for the
innovation process in other industries. Clark et al (1987) is a particularly clear
illustration of the important role played by the suppliers in giving Japanese
automobile producers a comparative advantage in developing new products. They
found that early supplier involvement in product design was a key part of Japanese
automakers´edge in introducing new models both faster and with fewer total labor
hours than their US and European counterparts.11
The supply of technological innovations in an industry depends, as mentioned, on
the various opportunities of the innovators to obtain economically-usable technical
knowledge. Empirical researchers have identified different sources of those
technological opportunities (for a recent survey see Cohen 1995). They can be
grouped into market- and non-market sources. The first subgroup consists of the
contributions of firms within the same line of business, of material and equipment
suppliers and of product users. The second subgroup encompasses the contributions
of university research, of government research labs, of other government agencies,
of professional or technical societies and of independent inventors. A voluminous
literature documents the contribution of these different sources. The case studies of
Jewkes et al. (1958) contain instances of virtually every type of those sources.
Specially important for this paper is von Hippel´s (1976, 1977, 1988) treatment of
the contributions of users to technological development in a variety of industries,
including scientific instruments and semiconductor process equipment. Other
researchers have on the other hand documented the contributions of input suppliers
to the innovation process in specific case studies (see Harhoff 1996a)12. Klevorick et
al. (1993) offer the first broad, cross-industry empirical examination of the
contributions to technical advance made by different sources of embodied and
                                          
11 Other researchers have studied other industries: for a study on biotechnology, see Pisano (1991),
for another one on robotics (and other examples) see Porter (1990).
12 Input suppliers were identified as major innovators in several industries: aluminum and
fiberglass (see Corey 1956); thermoplastics forming and modeling; application of industrial
gases (see WanderWerf 1992). The economic history literature has also shown the importance
of vertical relations for innovations in certain industries. As Rosenberg has remarked in his
treatise on technology and American economic growth, the machine tool industry in the 19th
century played a unique role both in the initial solution to technical problems in user industries,
such as textiles, and as the disseminator of these techniques to other industries, such as railroad
locomotive manufacture. Rosenberg´s description suggests that the users played a role in the
development of new equipment. He notes that before 1820 in the United States, one could not
identify a distinct set of firms that were specialists in the design and manufacture of machinery.
Machines were either produced by users or by firms engaged in the production of metal or
wooden products. Machinery-producing firms were thus first observed as adjuncts to textile
factories. However, once established, these firms played an important role as the transmission
center in the diffusion of new technology (Rosenberg 1972: 98-102).
7disembodied knowledge in the US manufacturing sector. They found that what they
call sources "within the industrial chain", such as buyers and materials and
equipment suppliers, apparently contribute much more to most industries‘ technical
advance than non-market sources such as universities and government labs. Similar
results have been found for Switzerland (see Harabi 1995 and Arvanitis el al. 1995),
for Germany (see "Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung" (ZEW) and
infas 1994) and for France (see Lhuillery 1996)13.
Finally, establishing vertical relations with either buyers or suppliers may also solve
problems arising from uncertainty in R&D or from indivisibilities in R&D (or other)
production processes to the extent that it creates a market in circumstances where
one would otherwise have been poorly defined. Furthermore, a captive market can
have the advantages of creating a pocket of demand for a product with certain well
defined characteristics, and this may serve to focus R&D efforts and stimulate
innovation.
2.2 Reasons for the choice of different modes of vertical relations
I now turn to the second question concerning the economic rationale behind the
choice of different modes of vertical relations between an innovating firm on one
hand and suppliers and users on the other. A transaction cost explanation for this
choice involves the question of how an innovating firm should organize its
boundary activities with other firms. Simply stated, Williamson proposes that firms
choose how to transact according to the criterion of minimizing the sum of
production and transaction costs. Production costs may differ between firms due to
the scale of operations, to learning, or to proprietary knowledge. Transaction costs
refer to the expenses incurred for writing and enforcing contracts, for haggling over
terms and contingent claims, for deviating from optimal kinds of investment in
order to increase dependence on a party or to stabilize a relationship, and for
administering a transaction.
The principal dimensions on which transaction costs economics presently relies for
purposes of transactions are (1) the frequency with which they recur, (2) the degree
and type of uncertainty to which they are subject, and (3) the condition of asset
specificity (Williamson 1989:142)14. In addition, transaction cost theory
                                          
13 All the surveys mentioned - Harabi (1995), Arvanitis et al. (1995), ZEW/infas (1994) and
Lhuillery (1996) - have used broad cross section studies based upon mail surveys.
14 In addition to these three dimensions, Williamson emphasizes the role of behavioral factors,
such as "bounded rationality"and "opportunism" for choosing different forms of governance
structures.
8distinguishes between basically three transaction coordination mechanisms:
markets, hierarchies (firms ) and hybrid coordination mechanisms15. In market
relationships, transactions take place between independent entities and are mediated
by a market mechanism. Exchanges that are straightforward and nonrepetitive and
that require no transaction-specific investments will take place between firms, that
is, across a market interface. In hierarchical relationships, the transaction partners
are part of one corporate body which somehow mediates the relationship through
such mechanisms as surveillance, evaluation, and direction. Transactions that
involve uncertainty about their outcome, that recur frequently and require
substantial transaction-specific investments - of money, time, or energy that cannot
be easily transferred to interaction with others - are likely to take place within
hierarchically organized firms16.
Hybrid forms - lying somehow "in between" markets and hierarchies - include
cooperation agreements between the transaction partners (see Richardson 1972);
they capture core benefits of markets while enjoying some transaction cost
advantages of hierarchies.
Interfirm cooperation agreements are agreements between two or more companies
that provide for a certain degree of collaboration between them and involve equity
participation or the creation of new companies as well as no-equity agreements.
Interfirm cooperation agreements can be formal or informal and have in general a
long-term character. A one- time purchase of goods and services is not a
cooperative agreement, but an agreement to purchase all inputs from one supplier
over the next ten years is a cooperative agreement.
From the standpoint of innovation Freemann (1991) distinguishes ten different
categories of cooperative arrangements: (1) joint ventures and research
corporations; (2) joint R&D agreements; (3) technology exchange agreements; (4)
direct investment (minority holdings) motivated by technology factors; (5) licensing
and second-sourcing agreements; (6) sub-contracting, production-sharing and
                                          
15 In its early development, transaction costs economics distinguished between two ideal types of
transactions only: markets and hierarchies. Later on, Williamson himself and other authors have
extended and refined this typology (see for instance Williamson (1985), Ouchi (1980), Jarillo
(1988) and MacNeil (1978))
16 According to transaction costs economics, transactions are moved out of markets into
hierarchies for two reasons. The first is "bounded rationality": the inability of economic agents
to write contracts that cover all possible contengencies. When transactions are internalized,
there is little need to anticipate such contengencies; they can be handled within the firm’s
"governance structure". The second reason is "opportunism", that is, the rational pursuit by
economic agents of their own advantage, by every means at their disposal, including guile and
deceit.
9supplier networks; (7) research associations; (8) government-sponsored joint
research programmes; (9) computerized data banks and value-added networks for
technical and scientific interchange; (10) informal agreements (vgl. Freemann
1991:502).
For illustration, some of these cooperative agreements can be defined as follows17:
Joint ventures are operations whereby a legally independent and autonomously
managed business enterprise is set up by two or more parent companies to run a
clearly defined set of activities in the common interest of the founding firms. Joint
R&D agreements cover agreements that regulate R&D sharing and/or transfer
between two or more companies. Joint R&D refers to agreements such as (1) joint
research pacts which establish joint undertaking of research projects with shared
resources and (2) joint development agreements. Research contracts regulate R&D
cooperation in which one partner, usually a large company, contracts another
company, frequently a small specialized R&D firm, to perform particular research
projects. R&D orders are normal market transactions between two or more firms
covering R&D and/or R&D-related services.
Each of the three basic transaction coordination mechanisms - markets, firms and
hybrid modes, including interfirm cooperation agreements- can be efficient,
depending on the expected amount of transaction costs involved. Knowing when to
integrate vertically, when to collaborate, and when to use the market is a major task
of transaction costs economics. In the area of innovative activities the following
examples clarify this central task of transaction costs economics: Vertical
integration - meaning the creation of a hierarchical relationship - is , on one hand,
more likely to predominate where the innovation chain is characterized by uncertain
property rights, transaction-specific assets, and complex technology transfer (see
Pisano 1991). On the other hand, "the complexity of scientific and technological
inputs, the uncertainty of economic conditions and the risks associated with
uncertain technological trajectories, appear to have reduced the advantages of
vertical and horizontal integration and made hierarchies a less efficient way of
responding to market imperfections. But the need to respond to and exploit market
imperfections in technology has also increased, and has thus pushed interfirm
agreements to the forefront of corporate strategy" (Chesnais 1998:84). Furthermore,
interfirm agreements bearing on technology are preferable to arm’s-length market
transactions for two reasons: First, "because long-term relationships are generally
vital in technology exchange", and second because in this way "technology is kept
out of the open market, preserving both entry and mobility barriers" (Chesnais
1988:84).
                                          
17 The definitions are borowed from Chesnais (1988:56) and Hagedoorn/Schakenraad (1990: 6).
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Innovating firms can, in addition, choose between different modes of cooperative
agreements. Contractual R&D cooperation, for instance, is more likely to be chosen
when R&D tasks are more routine and require less on-going interaction with the
client firm’s other manufacturing and non-manufacturing functions (see Mowery
1989). The situational characteristics best suited for a joint venture are high
uncertainty over specifying and monitoring performance, in addition to high degree
of asset specificity. It is uncertainty over performance which plays a fundamental
role in encouraging a joint venture over a contract (see Kogut 1988).
2.3 Summary
There is sufficient theoretical insight and empirical evidence suggesting the crucial
importance of cooperation between innovating firms, users of innovation and
suppliers. In the words of Geroski: "Indeed, so important are vertical associations
between suppliers and users on the one hand and innovation producers on the other,
that the innovation process is often user or supplier led and not producer led"
(Geroski 1992:142). These vertical relations are important for the successful
development and commercialization of innovations for three reasons: In general
terms, they provide innovators with technological opportunities that can enhance
their technological capabilities, they help innovators to solve the appropriability
problem and, finally, they help to reduce uncertainties about market demand. To
reap those benefits, innovators have to bear (transaction) costs. According to their
specific cost/benefit analysis, which can vary across industries, innovators choose
between different modes of vertical relations with suppliers and users. The choice
ranges from total integration, to tapered integration, to no integration, and from
long-term contracts, to short-term contracts, to no contracts. The purpose of the next
section is to investigate empirically the occurrence and importance of some of these
different modes of vertical relations between innovating firms, suppliers and users,
using data from Germany.
3 Vertical Relations Between Firms and Innovation: An Empirical
Investigation of German Firms
3.1 Data
During 1994 experts working in German industry were asked to answer questions
related to the issue of the occurrence and importance of different modes of relations
between innovating firms on one hand and suppliers and users on the other. These
questions are only a small part of a much larger survey called "Mannheim
Innovation Panel" (MIP) that started in Germany in summer 1993. The data were
collected by the "Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung" (ZEW) and the
11
"Institut für angewandte Sozialforschung" (infas). This project was financed and
supported by the German Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Technology
(BMBF). The first wave was part of the Community Innovation Survey of the
European Commission. The questionnaire follows the guidelines proposed by the
OECD (1992) and is a somewhat extended version of the harmonized questionnaire
for innovation surveys developed by EUROSTAT (for more details see Smith
1992).
The data used in this paper were gathered during the second wave of the MIP in
1994. Since an adequate completion of the questionnaire required solid knowledge
of the technology as well as of the market conditions in a certain line of business,
the experts questioned were mainly R&D executives of selected firms. The sample
frame for the survey was formed by R&D experts working in 12576 firms. Of the
12576 experts included in the survey, 3122, or 25 percent, completed the
questionnaire. These 3124 experts were active in 378 different lines of business (4-
or 5-digit-level industries, as defined by the German Federal Office of Statistics,
1979). Taking the industrial structure of their activities at the 2-digit level, 3.81 %
of the respondents worked in mining and energy, 9.41 % in foods and textile, 8.13
% in lumber and paper, 8.13 % in chemicals and petroleum, 6.82 % in synthetics
and rubber , 4.16 % in glass and ceramics, 4.26 % in basic metals processing, 7.68
% in fabricated metals processing, 17.38 % in machinery, 7.81 % in office
machinery, computer and electrical machinery, 6.24 %  in medical, precision and
optical instruments, 4.00 % in motor vehicles and 5.25 % in construction industries.
The remaining experts (6.91 %) were active in technical services. (See Felder el al.
1994 for a detailed description of this survey.)
According to the statistical tests conducted, the sample described above is
statistically representative neither of the distribution of industries in the German
manufacturing sector nor of firm size18. Proportionally more R&D experts from
large firms in innovative industries participated in the survey than experts from
small and medium-sized firms in less innovative industries.
A final point concerning the data should be kept in mind while reading and
interpreting the results listed below: All the survey-data used in this paper were
derived from subjective judgments based on imperfect information.
                                          
18 This statement applies only to the data used in this paper which are the original ones; they have
not been weighted according to the usual statistical techniques. The ZEW has, however,
conducted these techniques, such as the non-response analysis, and applied them to its different
datasets.
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3.2 Results
3.2.1 Overall Results
Graph 1 shows the experts’ responses to the question : "Cooperation with customers
might have a special importance for your innovative activities. Which of the
following modes of cooperation with your customers have you had in your firm (or
line of business) in the years 1991-1993:
1   Joint ventures
2   Joint development teams
3   Contractual R&D cooperation
4   R&D order to customers
5   Informal exchange of technical knowledge" (Questionnaire, P. 12)
The same question was asked with respect to the occurrence of the same modes of
R&D cooperation with suppliers. Before presenting the overall results, it is
important to make the following three remarks: First, the different modes of
interfirm cooperation listed above were not defined in the questionnaire19; there is a
risk that the surveyed experts could have had different definitions of these concepts
in mind. Second, the list of possible modes of R&D cooperation was not exhaustive;
cooperative arrangements like equity participation of innovating firms in suppliers´
and users´ firms and vice versa or technology exchange agreements were not listed.
Third, R&D order to either customers or suppliers is strictly speaking a normal
market transaction and not a mode of interfirm cooperative arrangements.
                                          
19 For a brief discussion of some of the major features of the different modes of cooperation see
section 2.2 above.
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Graph 1: Percents of Innovating Firms Having Cooperative Agreements with
Customers/Suppliers
Informal Exchange of Technical
Knowledge
R&D-Orders to
Customers/Suppliers
Formal R&D Cooperation
Joint Development Teams
Joint Ventures
0% 10 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%
Percents of innovating firms cooperating with their customers/suppliers
Customers
Suppliers
Of all innovating firms, 84 % indicated they had had cooperative relations with
customers. If we only consider those innovating firms that also had formal R&D
departments, 99 % of them responded that they had done so20. The phenomenon of
vertical relations between innovating, specially R&D performing, firms and
customers is therefore widespread in German industry.
The most cited mode of these cooperative arrangements between innovating firms
and their customers was informal exchange of technical knowledge (over 65 % of
all respondents), followed by joint development teams (around 25 %) and
contractual R&D cooperation (20 %). The least cited mode of cooperation was
R&D order to customers, followed by joint ventures.
The survey results concerning the occurrence of cooperative relations between
innovating firms and suppliers and those concerning cooperative relations between
the former and their customers are similar in some respects and different in others.
They are similar regarding the results that (1) the percentage of innovating firms
having cooperative arrangements with either customers or suppliers was equally
                                          
20 If we take the weighted figures, we obtain the following statistics: 78 % of all innovating and
99% of all innovating firms that also had R&D departments indicatd they had cooperative
arrangements with either customers or suppliers or both (for a description of the weights used
see Felder et al. 1994).
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high (in both cases they are around 84%) and that (2) informal exchange of
technical knowledge and joint development teams were the two most cited modes of
cooperation between both innovating firms and customers and between the former
and users. The empirical results differ with regard to the ranking given to the
remaining three modes of vertical relations. It seems that innovating firms had given
R&D-orders more often to suppliers than to customers and that they had more
contractual R&D cooperation with customers than with suppliers. Finally, joint
ventures were assumed to take place more frequently with customers than with
suppliers.
So far, the reported results have related to questions concerning the mere occurrence
of vertical cooperation between innovating firms and their customers or suppliers.
More significant, however, is the question of how important those cooperative
modes are for the innovative activities of the firms surveyed. The answers to these
questions were to be given on a scale from 1-5 (1=not important at all, 5=very
important) and are summarized in  Table 1. The first two columns of this table
indicate the unweighted averages of the answers and the standard deviation (in
parentheses). Columns 3 and 4 indicate the distribution of these averages. Q1 stands
for the first quartile; similarly, Q3 represents the third quartile. That means the
middle 50% of all the answers lies between these two values.
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Table 1: Importance of Different Modes of Cooperation between Innovating Firms and
either Customers or Suppliers (1 = not at all important, 5= very important;)
Mean (Std. Dev.) Q1 - Q3
Customers Suppliers Customer Suppliers
Joint Ventures 2.33
(1.45)
2.40
(1.51)
1-4 1-4
Joint Development Teams 3.33
(1.43)
3.36
(1.36)
2-5 2-4
Contractual R&D cooperation 3.24
(1.37)
3.25
(1.36)
2-4 2-4
R&D-Order to Customers/Suppliers 2.46
(1.47)
3.14
(1.26)
1-4 2-4
Informal Exchange of Technical
Knowledge
3.80
(1.11)
3.83
(1.06)
3-5 3-5
Q1: First quartile; Q3: Third Quartile
Informal exchange of technical knowledge was perceived on one hand as the most
important mode of cooperation between innovating firms and their customers,
followed by formal methods of cooperation such as joint development teams and
contractual R&D cooperation. Joint ventures and direct R&D order to customers
were seen, on the other hand, as the least important modes of vertical cooperation
with downstream users. Although the results seem to be very similar to those
concerning the importance of the five modes of vertical relations between
innovating firms and upstream suppliers, the numerical results relating to suppliers
are slightly higher than those relating to customers. On average, the vertical
relations between innovating firms and their suppliers were perceived as being
slightly more important than their relations with customers.
Comparing the overall results of our survey with those of other country studies, the
following observations can be made: First, the phenomenon of cooperative
associations between innovating firms and other firms is widespread.21 Second, the
result that informal exchange of technical knowledge is the most cited mode of
cooperation between innovating firms, customers and suppliers is confirmed by a
similar survey conducted in Switzerland (see Arvanitis et al. 1995:168). Finally, the
                                          
21 This phenomenon seems to be more important in Germany than in France or Switzerland,
however: In the latter country, only 43 % of the innovating firms surveyed responded that they
had cooperated with other firms (see Arvanitis el al. 1995:167). Comparable figures for France
are 55% and for Germany 78 %.
16
ranking of "contractual R&D cooperation" and "joint ventures" is similar in the two
studies. Of all formal modes of cooperation mentioned above "joint development
R&D" seems to be the most important one in the Swiss, the German and Merit
studies (for the latter see Hagedoorn/Schakenraad 1990:7)
3.2.2 Interindustry Differences
The overall results presented so far should not obscure the fact that there are
interindustry differences with respect to the occurrence of the different modes of
cooperation between innovating firms, suppliers and users. Statistical tests, such as
for example analysis of variance, show that there are significant interindustrial
differences (significance level 0.05) regarding the occurrence of modes of vertical
relations such as "joint development teams", "contractual R&D cooperation",
"direct R&D-orders". These interindustrial differences are further examined below.
The general empirical finding that informal modes of cooperation between
innovating firms and their customers are on average more important than the formal
ones is confirmed when results are disaggregated at lower levels of industry
classification. Viewing the results at the 2-digit level, the following observations
can be made (see Table 2):
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Table 2: Importance of Different Modes of Collaboration between Innovating Firms and
their Customers in 14 (2-Digit) Industries (5 = very important; 1 = not at all
important)
Joint
Ventures
Joint
Development
Teams
Contractual
R&D
cooperation
R&D-Order
to Customers
Informal
Exchange of
Technical
Knowledge
AM* S* AM* S* AM* S* AM* S* AM* S*
Mining/Energy 3.00 1.73 3.33 1.86 3.00 1.41 2.20 1.30 3.77 1.19
Foods/Textile 2.06 1.34 3.27 1.52 2.50 1.47 2.89 1.75 3.53 1.10
Lumber/Paper 2.05 1.57 3.02 1.52 2.33 1.46 2.24 1.70 3.57 1.14
Chemicals/
Petroleum
2.79 1.47 3.61 1.41 3.38 1.39 2.69 1.40 3.73 1.21
Synthetics/Rubber 2.00 1.36 3.52 1.34 3.26 1.46 2.68 1.49 3.96 1.06
Glass/Ceramics 1.62 1.19 3.14 1.53 2.85 1.57 1.86 1.35 3.71 1.29
Basic Metals
Processing.
2.27 1.35 3.96 1.11 3.71 1.16 2.77 1.48 3.91 1.11
Fabricated Metals
Processing
2.05 1.32 3.24 1.48 3.00 1.53 2.05 1.36 3.86 0.99
Machinery 2.22 1.50 3.08 1.46 3.20 1.27 2.42 1.42 3.93 1.08
Office Machinery
and Computers /
Electrical
Machinery
2.17 1.44 3.18 1.47 3.38 1.34 1.87 1.25 3.77 1.20
Medical,
Precision, Optical
Instruments
2.77 1.43 3.37 1.39 3.38 1.21 2,69 1.31 3.77 0.98
Motor Vehicles 2.56 1.58 3.86 1.15 3.26 1.41 2.57 1.66 3.89 1.11
Construction 2.83 1.27 3.07 1.49 2.80 1.40 2.50 1.52 3.63 1.28
Technical Services 2.59 1.58 3.32 1.40 3.80 1.24 2.77 1.63 3.87 1.11
Overall Industry
Mean
2.33 1.45 3.33 1.43 3.24 1.37 2.46 1.47 3.80 1.11
* AM: Arithmetic Mean; S: Standard Deviation
The highlighted figures indicate above average responses, compared with the overall industry
mean
18
Informal exchange of technological knowledge was perceived in all 14 industries as
an important mode of vertical relations. It was given, however, a score above
average in the synthetics/rubber, basic and fabricated metals processing, machinery,
motor vehicles and technical services industries, and below average in the
remaining industries.
Joint development teams as the second most important means of cooperation
between producers and users of innovations was considered more important in some
industries (for instance, in basic metals processing, motor vehicles,
chemicals/petroleum and synthetics/rubber industries) than in others (lumber/paper,
construction, machinery industries etc.).
Contractual R&D cooperation between producers and users of innovation was
viewed on average as moderately important. Its importance varies across industries,
however: it was given an above-average score in, say, basic metals processing,
technical services and chemicals/petroleum industries, and below-average in the
foods and textile, lumber/paper and construction industries.
Giving R&D-orders to customers was seen by innovating firms as moderately
important, especially by firms from the following industries: foods/textile, che-
micals/petroleum, synthetics/rubber and motor vehicles. Experts from office
machinery and computers, or glass and ceramic products industries rated the
importance of this method of cooperation as very low.
Joint ventures were perceived, as already mentioned, as being the least important
mode of vertical relations between innovating firms and their customers. As to the
industry-specific importance of this method of cooperation, the following
observation can be made: Joint ventures were rated above average in the industries
"mining/energy", "chemicals/petroleum" "medical, precision and optical instru-
ments", "motor vehicles", "construction"and "technical services". In all the remain-
ing industries they were rated below average.
Finally, Table 2 can also be read horizontally and thus answers the following
question: "For a given industry, which are the most important modes of cooperation
between innovating firms and users?" The answer for the mining and energy
industries, for instance, is that"informal exchange of technical knowledge" is the
most important mode of vertical cooperation with its customers, followed by "joint
development teams".
As to the industry-specific differences concerning the importance of the different
modes of cooperation between innovating firms and their suppliers, the following
observations can be made (see Table 3):
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Table 3: Importance of Different Modes of Cooperation between Innovating Firms and
their Suppliers in 14 (2-Digit) Industries (1 = not at all important; 5 = very
important)
Joint
Ventures
Joint
Development
Teams
Contractual
R&D
cooperation
R&D-Order to
Suppliers
Informal
Exchange of
Technical
Knowledge
AM* S* AM* S* AM* S* AM* S* AM* S*
Mining/Energy 1.00 0.00 3.67 2.31 2.00 1.41 2.50 2.12 3.83 1.47
Foods/Textile 2.18 1.47 3.47 1.25 3.05 1.27 3.03 1.31 3.80 1.06
Lumber/Paper 2.40 1.68 3.27 1.43 3.32 1.64 2.95 1.27 3.89 0.98
Chemicals/
Petroleum
2.95 1.54 3.62 1.32 3.13 1.40 3.50 1.11 3.87 1.03
Synthetics/Rubber 2.20 1.57 3.57 1.20 3.12 1.51 3.23 1.41 3.99 1.08
Glass/Ceramics 1.75 1.42 2.77 1.45 2.50 1.69 2.79 1.40 3.68 1.28
Basic Metals
Processing
2.57 1.40 3.69 1.25 3.88 1.22 3.18 1.40 4.17 0.82
Fabricated Metals
Processing
2.28 1.53 3.17 1.42 2.73 1.44 2.53 1.22 3.78 1.04
Machinery 2.61 1.61 3.54 1.40 3.42 1.24 3.28 1.23 3.88 1.07
Office Machinery
and Computers/
Electrical
Machinery
2.19 1.44 2.96 1.44 3.22 1.38 3.00 1.25 3.92 1.00
Medical, Precision,
Optical Instru-
ments
2.09 1.28 3.14 1.32 3.34 1.22 3.28 1.14 3.72 1.06
Motor Vehicles 2.46 1.51 3.80 1.13 3.65 1.29 3.47 1.18 3.68 1.03
Construction 3.50 1.31 3.29 1.20 3.39 1.04 3.18 1.33 3.64 1.10
Technical Services 2.75 1.87 3.20 1.61 3.12 1.40 2.68 1.38 3.73 1.27
Overall Industry
Mean
2.40 1.51 3.31 1.36 3.25 1.36 3.14 1.21 3.83 1.06
* AM: Arithmetical Mean; S: Standard Deviation
The highlighted figures indicate above average responses, compared with the overall industry
mean
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Informal exchange of technological knowledge was perceived in all 14 industries as
an important mode of vertical relations. It was, however, given a score above
average in the industries "lumber/paper", "chemicals/petroleum",
"synthetics/rubber", "machinery", and "office machinery and computer/electrical
machinery" and below average in the remaining industries.
Joint development teams as the second most important means of cooperation
between innovating firms and input suppliers was considered more important in
some industries (for instance, in the mining/energy, foods/textile,
chemicals/petroleum, synthetics/rubber, basic metals processing, machinery, and
motor vehicles industries) than in others (lumber/paper, construction industries,
etc.).
Contractual R&D cooperation between innovating firms and inputs suppliers was
viewed on average as moderately important. Its importance varies across industries,
however: it was given a score above average by experts from the lumber/paper,
basic metals processing, machinery, medical, precision, optical instruments, motor
vehicles, and construction industries, and below average by experts form the
mining/energy, foods/textile, and remaining industries.
Giving R&D-orders to suppliers was seen by innovating firms as moderately
important, especially by experts from the following industries: chemicals/petroleum,
synthetics/rubber and motor vehicles. Experts from office machinery and computers
or glass and ceramic products industries rated the importance of this method of
cooperation as very low.
Joint ventures were perceived, as already mentioned, as the least important mode of
all vertical relations between innovating firms and their suppliers. As to the
industry-specific importance of this method of cooperation the following
observation can be made: Joint ventures were rated above average in the industries
"lumber/paper", "chemicals/petroleum" "synthetics/rubber", "machinery", and
"office machinery and computer/electrical machinery. In all the remaining industries
they were rated below average.
Finally, Table 3 can also be read horizontally and thus answers the following
question: "For a given industry, which are the most important modes of cooperation
between innovating firms and suppliers?" For the food and textile industries, for
instance, "informal exchange of technical knowledge" is the most important mode
of vertical cooperation with input suppliers, followed by "joint development teams".
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3.2.3 Vertical Relations Between Firms and Innovation: The Patterns
So far, the different modes of cooperation between innovating firms and either
customers or suppliers have been analyzed and the empirical results concerning
their existence and importance have been presented separately. Now, two questions
can be raised: first, do dependencies between these different modes of vertical
cooperation exist? and second, - based on these dependencies - can clusters of firms
related to their cooperation patterns be constructed? In order to answer these two
questions empirically, the usual methods of multivariate statistics, above all
correlation, principal components and cluster analysis, were used.
The results of the correlation analysis are summarized in Tables 4 and 5. These
tables show correlations among the five different modes of cooperation between
innovating firms and their customers (Table 4) and between innovating firms and
their suppliers (Table 5). In each cell of the two matrices the entry indicates
correlation coefficients of individual responses. The results can be interpreted as
follows: The different modes of cooperation between innovating firms and either
customers or suppliers correlate with each other. A statistically significant
correlation between almost all the different modes of cooperation exists. Certain
patterns of dependencies among the different modes of cooperation emerge,
however. On one hand there is a statistically significant correlation between the
formal modes of cooperation (the four variables 33B.1- 33B.4), on the other hand
there is first no statistically significant correlation between the variable "informal
exchange of technical knowledge" and the other modes of vertical cooperation
(specially "joint ventures" in Tab 4), and second , if there is a correlation between
informal exchange of technical knowledge and the other four variables, the
correlation coefficients are lower than those of the four formal modes of
cooperation.
The results of the correlation analysis suggest that the five modes of vertical
relations between producers, suppliers and users of innovations can be reduced to
two subgroups: the first one includes formal methods of cooperation (the first four
methods), the second one includes informal ones, summarized under the rubric
"Informal exchange of technical knowledge".
Table 4: Correlation Matrix of the Importance of Different Modes of Cooperation between
Innovating Firms and their Customers
33B.1 33B.2 33B.3 33B.4 33B.5
33B.1    Joint Ventures 1.00 0.51* 0,48* 0.44* 0.09
33B.2    Joint Development Teams 1.00 0.62* 0.54* 0.36*
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33B.3    Contractual R&D cooperation 1.00 0.59* 0.34*
33B.4    R&D-Order to Customers 1.00 0.27*
33B.5    Informal Exchange of Technical
Knowledge
1.00
* Significant at the 0.01 level
Table 5: Correlation Matrix of the Importance of Different Modes of Cooperation between
Innovating Firms and their Suppliers
34B.1 34B.2 34B.3 34B.4 34B.5
34B.1    Joint Ventures 1.00 0.60* 0.53* 0.49* 0.29*
34B.2    Joint Development Teams 1.00 0.72* 0.58* 0.47*
34B.3    Contractual R&D cooperation 1.00 0.70* 0.40*
34B.4    R&D-Order to Suppliers 1.00 0.43*
34B.5    Informal Exchange of Technical
             Knowledge
1.00
* Significant at the 0.01 level
These findings will now be further analyzed using other statistical techniques:
principal components and cluster analysis.
The principal components analysis generally transforms a given set of variables
(here: the five modes of vertical relations) into a new set of compounded variables
(principal components) that are mutually orthogonal (not correlated). The results of
this analysis - using the individual responses of the survey - are summarized in
Table 6. The first two columns show the weights associated with the first two
principal components when the five questions relating to the importance of the
modes of cooperation between innovating firms and their customers are analyzed.
The next two columns report the results of a principal components analysis on the
set of questions related to the cooperation modes with suppliers. In both cases, the
results suggest that the five means of vertical cooperation can be reduced to two
dimensions (principal components). The first principal component loads most
heavily on formal means of cooperation (means no.1, 2, 3, 4). The second
component loads mainly on informal exchange of technical knowledge (means
no.5).
The interpretation of the results of the principal component analysis that the data do
reduce the five modes of cooperation to two dimensions is statistically quite
satisfactory. As Table 6 indicates, when the questions are analyzed for customers,
the first two components explain 65 percent of the variance in the responses to five
questions, and when the questions are analyzed for suppliers, the two components
explain 70 percent of the variance.
23
The hypothesis that the five modes of vertical R&D cooperation can be reduced to
two subgroups will further be pursued by means of cluster analysis. The cluster
analysis classified in this case the 3000 surveyed firms (or business units of
multidivisional firms) according to two principal components constructed above
(see Table 6).22 As reported in Tables 7 and 8, two clusters were found for both
vertical relations with customers and for vertical relations with suppliers. In the case
of vertical relations with suppliers the first cluster consists of 2407 innovating firms
- or 89% of all innovating firms - that used exclusively informal methods of
cooperation. The second cluster includes 299 - or 11% of all - innovating firms that
used formal modes of vertical cooperation. The sectoral distribution of the two
clusters is shown in Table 7.
Table 6: Principal Components Analysis of Different Modes of Cooperation with
eitherCustomers or Suppliers
Customers Suppliers
Coefficients
of 1st
Principal
Component
Coefficients
of 2nd
Principal
Component
Coefficients
of 1st
Principal
Component
Coefficients
of 2nd
Principal
Component
1. Joint Ventures 0.77 -0.23 0.83 0.01
2. Joint Development Teams 0.67 0.31 0.80 0.19
3. Contractual R&D
    cooperation
0.68 0.42 0.77 0.33
4. R&D-Order to Customers 0.75 0.13 0.65 0.46
5. Informal Exchange of
    Technical Knowledge
0.07 0.93 0.14 0.95
Cumulative Variance
Explained
0.46 0.65 0.56 0.72
Comparing the cluster assignment for modes of vertical relations with downstream
customers to cluster assignment for modes of vertical relations with upstream
suppliers, one can conclude that they are - apart from small nuances concerning the
sectoral distribution - similar for both clusters. Again, only 12 % of all innovating
firms (cluster 1) used formal modes of cooperative agreements with customers,
                                          
22 The procedure used here is the SAS procedure called "FASTCLUS". It is a non-hierarchical
method of determining disjunct clusters on the basis of Euclidean distances: The observations
(here: the 1517 firms) are classified in such a way that each observation is attributed to one
single cluster only (see SAS User’s Guide: Statistics, version 5, 1985:377-402).
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while the remaining majority, 88% of all innovating firms surveyed (cluster 2)
relied exclusively on informal modes of cooperation (that is on informal exchange
of technical knowledge). The sectoral distribution of the two clusters is again shown
in Table 8.
To sum up, the results of multivariate statistical analysis (correlation, principal
components and cluster analysis) suggest that the various modes of R&D
cooperation between innovating firms on one hand and customers and suppliers on
the other could be reduced to two subgroups: the first one includes formal modes of
cooperation, the second one includes informal exchange of technical knowledge. On
this basis patterns of cooperative agreements could be established for different
industries and technological fields (see Table 9 & 10).
Table 7: Number of Firms in Clusters on the Basis of the Importance of Different Modes of
R&D-Cooperation with Suppliers in 14 Different Industries. Cluster 1: firms using
formal modes of R&D cooperation; Cluster 2: firms using informal modes of
R&D-cooperation
Cluster 1 Cluster 2
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Mining/Energy 99 4,11% 4 1,34%
Foods/Textile 216 8,97% 15 5,02%
Lumber/Paper 212 8,81% 17 5,69%
Chemicals/Petroleum 174 7,23% 29 9,70%
Synthetics/Rubber 167 6,94% 15 5,02%
Glass/Ceramics 100 4,15% 12 4,01%
Basic Metals
Processing
63 2,62% 15 5,02%
Fabricated Metals
Processing
241 10,01% 21 7,02%
Machinery 375 15,58% 48 16,05%
Office Machinery
and
Computers/Electrical
Machinery
172 7,15% 30 10,03%
Medical, Precision,
Optical Instruments
152 6,31% 39 13,04%
Motor Vehicles 121 5,03% 25 8,36%
Construction 165 6,86% 7 2,34%
Technical Services 150 6,23% 22 7,36%
Total 2407 100,00% 299 100,00%
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Table 8: Number of Firms in Clusters on the Basis of the Importance of Different Modes of
R&D cooperation with Customers in 14 Different Industries. Cluster 1: firms using
formal modes of R&D cooperation; Cluster 2: firms using informal modes of
R&D-cooperation
Cluster 1 Cluster 2
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Mining/Energy 6 1,89% 98 4,09%
Foods/Textile 18 5,68% 241 10,07%
Lumber/Paper 19 5,99% 223 9,31%
Chemicals/Petroleum 29 9,15% 168 7,02%
Synthetics/Rubber 15 4,73% 159 6,64%
Glass/Ceramics 19 5,99% 99 4,14%
Basic Metals
Processing
8 2,52% 66 2,76%
Fabricated Metals
Processing
23 7,26% 244 10,19%
Machinery 49 15,46% 353 14,75%
Office Machinery
and
Computers/Electrical
Machinery
32 10,09% 168 7,02%
Medical, Precision,
Optical Instruments
45 14,20% 145 6,06%
Motor Vehicles 30 9,46% 118 4,93%
Construction 8 2,52% 166 6,93%
Technical Services 16 5,05% 146 6,10%
Total 317 100,00% 2394 100,00%
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Table 9: Number of Firms in Clusters on the Basis of the Importance of Different Modes of
R&D cooperation with Suppliers in 11 Different Technological Fields. Cluster 1:
Cluster of firms using formal modes of R&D cooperation; Cluster 2: Cluster of
firms using informal modes of R&D cooperation
Cluster of firms using informal
modes of R&D cooperation
(Cluster 1)
Cluster of Firms using formal
modes of R&D cooperation
(Cluster 2)
frequency in % frequency in %
New materials 179 18,80% 527 22,80%
Microelectronic and
semiconductor-
technology
81 8,51% 150 6,49%
Laser-technology,
optoelectronics,
displays
55 5,78% 104 4,50%
Software, simulation
and arificial
intelligence
136 14,29% 323 13,98%
Telecommunication
and information-
technology
69 7,25% 152 6,58%
Bio-technology 18 1,89% 34 1,47%
Medicine and health
care-technology
33 3,47% 66 2,86%
Flexible integrated
manufacturing (FIT)
122 12,82% 354 15,32%
Transport, traffic and
logistic
80 8,40% 196 8,48%
Transformation and
storing of energy
44 4,62% 92 3,98%
Environment-
technology and
resource saving
technology
135 14,18% 313 13,54%
Total 952 100,00% 2311 100,00%
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Table 10: Number of Firms in Clusters on the Basis of the Importance of Different Modes of
R&D cooperation with Customers in 11 Different Technological Fields. Cluster 1:
of firms using informal modes of R&D cooperation; Cluster 2: Cluster of firms
using informal modes of R&D cooperation
Cluster of firms using formal
modes of R&D cooperation
(Cluster 1)
Cluster of firms using informal
modes of R&D cooperation
(Cluster 2)
frequency in % frequency in %
New materials 543 22,29% 159 19,23%
Microelectronic and
semiconductor-techno-
logy
154 6,32% 68 8,22%
Laser-technology,
optoelectronics,
displays
114 4,68% 41 4,96%
Software, simulation
and arificial
intelligence
335 13,75% 127 15,36%
Telecommunication
and information-
technology
156 6,40% 63 7,62%
Bio-technology 45 1,85% 16 1,93%
Medicine and health
care-technology
79 3,24% 28 3,39%
Flexible integrated
manufacturing (FIT)
362 14,86% 108 13,06%
Transport, traffic and
logistic
206 8,46% 64 7,74%
Transformation and
storing of energy
102 4,19% 35 4,23%
Environment-
technology and
resource saving
technology
340 13,96% 118 14,27%
Total 2436 100,00% 827 100,00%
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4 Conclusions
I conclude the paper with a brief summary of the results, some reflections on them
and a few brief observations on the implications they carry for public policy
towards vertical R&D cooperation between firms.
The purpose of this paper was to investigate empirically the occurrence and
importance of different modes of vertical relations between innovating firms,
suppliers and users, using data from Germany. The main results can be summarized
as follows:
84 % of all innovating firms responded that they have had cooperative agreements
with either suppliers or customers or both. This percentage is even higher (99 %) if
we consider only those innovating firms that have also had formal R&D
departments. The phenomenon of vertical R&D cooperation is therefore widespread
among German firms.
Informal exchange of technical knowledge was perceived as the most important
mode of cooperation between innovating firms on one hand and customers and
suppliers on the other, followed by formal methods of cooperation such as joint
development teams and contractual R&D cooperation. Joint ventures and direct
R&D orders to either customers or suppliers were seen as the least important modes
of vertical cooperation.
The occurrence and importance of cooperative agreements between innovating
firms, users and input suppliers vary from one industry to another.
Results of the methods of multivariate statistical analysis (correlation, principal
components and cluster analysis) suggested that the various modes of vertical
relations between innovating firms on one hand and customers and suppliers on the
other could be reduced to two subgroups: the first one includes formal modes of
cooperation, the second one includes informal exchange of technical knowledge. On
this basis patterns of cooperative agreements could be established.
The empirical results from German industry confirm by and large the overall a-
priori predictions of the New Industrial Organization literature in the area of
innovation. This literature emphasizes, as mentioned in section 2 above, the central
role of suppliers and users in the innovation process. Accordingly, it is not
surprising that the majority (84 %) of German innovating firms have had R&D
cooperation agreements with either suppliers or users or both. The high percentage
of German firms having this kind of vertical relations might be explained by the fact
that the German economy is technologically highly developed and therefore the
degree of the division of - innovative - labor is very high as well.
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The empirical finding that informal exchange of technical knowledge was perceived
as the most important mode of R&D cooperation between innovating firms on one
hand and customers and suppliers on the other can be interpreted as follows: From
the standpoint of transaction costs analysis one can pinpoint two central dimensions
of such transactions: uncertainty and asset specificity. Both dimensions are
important in the interactions between innovators, suppliers and customers, and thus
make trust an important element of their relations. Informal exchange of
information can be seen as trust-building steps towards more formal modes of
cooperation23.
From the perspective of the New Empirical Industrial Organization one can add that
some of the informal exchange of technical knowledge between innovating firms,
suppliers and users can be interpreted as "knowledge spillovers". According to
Grilliches such knowledge spillovers are "both prevalent and important" (Grilliches
1992: 29). Nadiri goes even further: "As to the existence and magnitude of R&D
spillovers, the evidence points to sizable spillovers both at the firm and industry
levels. The spillover effects of R&D are often much larger than the effects of own
R&D at the industry level" (see Nadiri 1993:35).
On the other hand one can argue that this interpretation is only partly true, due to
the fact that much of this informal exchange of technical knowledge between
innovating firms, suppliers and customers can be seen as "Informal Know-how
Trading" between partners. This has been observed between engineers in competing
steel minimill producers in the US, an exchange that often went well beyond simple
exchanges of data to include free training and the exchange of personnel  (see von
Hippel 1988, Schrader 1991). Another quite interesting interpretation of the
existence of informal networks has been put forward by Freeman: "Informal
networks ... are extremely important but very hard to classify and measure.
However, just because of this difficulty it is essential to notice that they have a role
somewhat analogous to "tacit knowledge" within firms. It is very generally
recognized that in the technology accumulation process within firms and other
organizations, tacit knowledge is often more important than codified formal
specifications, blue-prints, etc.." (Freeman 1991:503).
In sum, both formal and informal cooperative arrangements between innovation
producers, innovation users and suppliers are important. Innovation does require
informal or formal coordination between agents operating at different stages of the
                                          
23 Williamson has also seen the importance of trust in interfirm relations: "To be sure, trust is
important and businessmen rely on it much more extensively than is commenly
realized."(Williamson 1985:108)
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innovative chain. The question now is, what are the public policy implications of
this empirical finding. The answer to this question has to be differentiated. In the
area of informal modes of R&D cooperation, public policy has no role to play: It is
up to the innovating firms themselves to set up the kind of informal relations with
users and customers that are  most useful for them. In the area of formal cooperative
agreements, public policy can affect microeconomic decisions concerning two
major issues: first, can vertical relations between innovation producers, users and
suppliers be formed at all, and second, are the right kinds of vertical relations
formed. Three sets of public policies can be brought to bear on both of these issues:
Anti-trust (or merger) policy , public procurement policies and regional policy (see
Geroski 1992:143).
Anti-trust policy can be used to discourage horizontal mergers in sectors where
horizontal collusion is unlikely to yield dividends, and to discourage vertical
integration in sectors where less formal vertical relations are likely to be desirable.
Public procurement can be used to mobilize and focus demand and therefore
stimulate innovation through the creation of a "user market". Regional policy may
also stimulate vertical relations between innovation producers, suppliers and users
at a well defined location. "It has often been argued that regional policy ought to
encourage industrial specialization to build up around regional growth points. This
is effectively a strategy which involves attracting clusters of mutually supporting
activities  together at a particular location.  Its appeal is that it enables firms to
benefit from a range of external economies, facilitating interactions between
suppliers, producers and users. Distance often magnifies problems created by
market failures, and proximity often facilitates the emergence of the kinds of formal
and informal alliances which are necessary to overcome them." (Geroski 1992:145)
In short - as Gerosski observs: "Markets are inter-related, and the emergence of new
products and processes often requires that the activities of agents operating in
several markets be coordinated. This network of inter-market relations opens up
numerous routes into any particular market, and gives policyholders several levers
with which to try to stimulate industrial innovation. Vertical strategies often involve
trying to bridge specific market failures that separate two or more markets (or
activities), and may, for this reason, prove to be more effective than horizontal
strategies which neglect inter-market linkages." (Geroski 1992:146)
32
References
Anderson, J. C., Narus, J.A.(1990), "A Model of Distributor Firm and Manufacturer Firm Working
Partnerships", Journal of Marketing, 42-58.
Arora, A, Gambardella, A (1991), "Evaluating Technological Information and Utilizing it",
Working Paper No.91-40. Carnegie Mellon University.
Arrow, K.J. (1962), "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention", in: The
Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity, ed. R.R. Nelson. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
Arvanitis, S. el al (1995), Innovationsaktivitäten in der Schweizer Industrie. Eine Analyse der
Ergebnisse der Innovationserhebung 1993. Bern: Bundesamt für Konjunkturfragen.
Brock G.W. (1975), The US Computer Industry. Cambridge Mass.: Ballinger.
Cecchini, P. (1988), 1992. The European Challenge. Aldershot.
Chesnais, F. (1988), "Technical Cooperation Agreements Between Firms", STI Review, 4:51-119.
Clark, K. et al. (1987), "Product Development in the World Automobile Industry", Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity, 3:729-81.
Cohen W.M, Levinthal, D.A. (1990), "Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective on Learning and
Innovation", Administrative Science Quarterly, 35:128-52.
Cohen W.M, Levinthal, D.A. (1994), "Fortune Favors the Prepared Firm", Management Science
40:227-51.
Cohen, W.M., Levinthal, D.A. (1989), "Innovation and Learning:  The two Faces of R&D",
Economic Journal, 99:569-596.
Commission of European Communities (1993), Growth, Competitiveness, Employment: The
Challenges and Ways Forward into the 21st Century, White Paper, Supplement 6/93.
Corey, E.R. (1956), "The Development of Market for New Materials", Division of Research,
Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, Boston Mass.
DeBresson, C., Amesse, F. (1991), "Networks of Innovators: A Review and an Introduction to the
Issue", Research Policy 20:363-80.
Dorfman, N.S. (1987), Innovation and Market Structure: Lessons from the Computer and
Semiconductor Industries. Cambridge, Mass.:Ballinger.
Felder, J. et al. (1994), Innovationsverhalten der Deutschen Wirtschaft. Methodenbericht zur
Innovationserhebung 1993. ZEW Dokumentation Nr. 94-06.
Felder, J. et al. (1996), "Appropriability, Opportunity, Firm Size and Innovation Activities.
Empirical Results Using East and West German Firm Level Data", in: Kleinknecht, A.
(ed.), R&D and Innovation. Evidence from New Indicators, Macmillan Press
(forthcomming)
Freeman, C. (1987), Technology Policy and Economic Performance, Lessons from Japan. London:
Francis Pinter.
Freeman, C. (1991), "Networks of Innovators: A Synthesis of Research Issues", Research Policy
20:499-514.
Geroski, P. A. (1992), "Vertical Relations between Firms and Industrial Policy", Economic
Journal, 102: 138-51.
Geroski, P. A. (1993), "Antitrust Policy Towards Co-operative R&D Ventures", Oxford Review of
Economic Policy, 9:58-71.
Geroski, P. A. (1995), "Markets for Technology: Knowledge, Innovation and Appropriability", in:
Stoneman, P. (ed.), Handbook of The Economics of Innovation and Technological
Change. Oxford: Blackwell.
33
Griliches, Z. (1992), "The Search for R&D Spillovers", The Scandinavian Journal of Economics,
94:29-47.
Hagedoorn, J., Schakenraad (1990), "Inter-firm Partnerships and Cooperative Strategies in Core
Technologies", in: New Explorations in the Economics of Technical Change, Freeman, C.
(ed.). London: Pinter.
Harabi, N. (1995), "Sources of Technical Progress: Evidence from Swiss Industry”, Economics of
Innovation and New Technology, 4:67-76.
Harabi, N. (1995b), "Appropriability of Technological Innovations: An Empirical Analysis".
Research Policy, 24:981-992.
Harhoff, D. (1996), "Strategic Spillovers and Incentives for Research and Development",
Management Science, 42:
Hippel, E. von (1976), "The Dominant Role of Users in the Scientific Instrument Innovation
Process", Research Policy, 5:212-239.
Hippel, E. von (1977), "The Dominant Role of the User in Semiconductor and Electronic
Subassembly Process Innovation", IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, EM-
24:60-71.
Hippel, E. von (1978), "Users as Innovators", Technology Review, 80:31-9.
Hippel, E. von (1982), "Appropriability of Innovation Benefits as a Predictor of the Source of
Innovation", Research Policy 11:95-115.
Hippel, E. von (1987), "Cooperation between Rivals: Informal Know-How Trading", Research
Policy, 11: 291-302.
Hippel, E. von (1988), The Sources of Innovations. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hippel, E. von (1994), "Sticky Information" and the Locus of Problem Solving: Implications for
Innovation", Mangement Science 40:429-39.
Jarillo, J.C. (1988). "On Strategic Networks", Strategic Management Journal, 9:31-41.
Jewkes, D., Sawers, J., Stillerman, R. (1958), The Sources of Invention. London: Macmillan.
Jorde, T.M., Teece, D.J. (1990), "Innovation and Cooperation: Implications for Competition and
Antitrust", Journal of Economic Perspectives, 4:75-96.
Katz, .M.L.(1986), "An Analysis of Cooperative Research and Development", Rand Journal of
Economics 17:527-43.
Katz, .M.L., Ordover, J. A.(1990), "R&D Cooperation and Competition", Brookings Papers on
Microeconomics, 137-203
Kirchmann, E. M. W. (1994), Innovationskooperation zwischen Herstellern und Anwendern.
Wiesbaden: Deutscher Universitätsverlag.
Klein, B., Crawford, R., Alchian, A. (1978), "Vertical Integration, Competitive Rents and the
Competitive Contracting Process", Journal of Law and Economics, 21:297-326.
Kleinknecht, A., Reijnen, J.O. N. (1992), "Why Do Firms Cooperate on R&D? An Empirical
Study", Research Policy, 21:1-13.
Klevorick, A.K., Levin, R.C. Nelson, R.R., Winter, S.G. (1993), "On the Sources and Significance
of Interindustry Differences in Technological Opportunities", Yale University, mimeo.
Kogut, B. (1988), "Joint Ventures: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives", Strategic Management
Journal 9:319-332.
König, H., Licht, G., Staat M. (1993), "F&E-Kooperationen und Innovationsaktivität", in: Gahlen,
B., Ramser, H.J., Hesse, H. (Hrsg), Ökonomische Probleme der europäischen Integration,
Schriftenreihe des wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Seminars Ottbeuren, Bd. 23, Tübingen.
L'huillery, S. (1996), L´Innovation Technologique dans l´Industrie. Ministere de L´Industrie, de la
Poste et des Telecommunications. Service des statistiques industrielles. Paris
34
Licht, G. (1994), "Gemeinsam forschen - Motive und Verbreitung strategischer Allianzen in
Europa", ZEW-Wirtschaftsanalysen, Quartalshefte des Zentrums für Euroäische
Wirtschaftsforschung, Mannheim. Nr. 4, 371-400.
MacNeil (1978), "Contracts: Adjustment of Long-term Economic Relations under Classical,
Neoclassical, and Contract Law". Northwestern  University Law Review, 72:854-906.
Monteverde, K.,Teece, D. (1982), "Appropriable Rents and Quasi-Vertical Integration", Journal of
Law and Economics, 25:321-328.
Mowery, D.C. (1989): "Collaborative Ventures Between US and Foreign Manufacturing Firms",
Research Policy, 18:19-33.
Nadiri, I.M. (1993), "Innovations and Technological Spillovers", NBER Working Paper No. 4423.
Nelson, R.R. (1986), "Institutions Supporting Technical Advance in Industry", American
Economic Review Proceedings ,76:186-9.
Nelson, R.R. (1989), "Capitalism as an Engine of Progress", in: Industrial Dynamics, ed. Carlsson,
B. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Nelson, R.R. (ed.) (1992), Technical Innovation and National Systems, New York: Oxford
University Press.
Nelson, R.R., Peck, M.J., Kalachek, E.D. (1967), Technology, Economic Growth and Public
Policy. Washington, D.C.:The Brookings Institution.
Ouchi, W.G. (1980), "Markets, Bureaucraties, and Clans", Administrative Science Quarterly, 25:
129-141.
Peck, M.J. (1962), "Inventions in the Postwar", in: R.R. Nelson (ed.), The Rate and Direction of
Inventive Activity . Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Perry , M. (1989), "Vertical Integration", In: Handbook of Industrial Organization, ed. R.
Schmalensee and R. Willig. Amsterdam: North Holland.
Pfeffer, J., Nowack, P. (1976), "Joint Ventures and Interorganizational Interdependence",
Administrative Science Quarterly, 398-418.
Pisano , G.P.(1989), "Using Equity Participation to Support Exchange: Evidence from the
Biotechnology Industry", Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 5:109-26.
Pisano , G.P.(1990), "The R&D Boundaries of the Firm: An Empirical Analysis", Administrative
Science Quarterly, 35:153-76.
Pisano , G.P. (1991),"The Governance of Innovation: Vertical Integration and Collaborative
Arrangements in the Biotechnology Industry", Research Policy 20:237-49.
Porter, M (1990), The Competitive Advantage of Nations. London: Macmillan.
Rosenberg, N. (1972), Technology and American Economic Growth. Armonk: M. E. Sharpe.
Scherer , F.M. , Ross, D.(1990), Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, Boston:
Houghton.
Schrader, S (1990), Zwischenbetrieblicher Informationstransfer: Eine empirische Analyse
kooperativen Verhaltens, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
Schrader, S.(1991), "Informal Technology Transfer between Firms: Cooperation through
Information Trading", Research Policy 20:153-70.
Schrader, S.(1993), "Kooperation", in: Hauschildt, J, Grün, O. (eds ), Ergebnisse Empirischer
Betriebswirtschaftlicher Forschung. Zu einer Realtheorie der Unternehmung. Festschrift
für Eberhard Witte. Stuttgart: Schäffer- Poeschel Verlag.  221-254.
Schrader,S.,Sattler H. (1993), "Zwischenbetriebliche Kooperation: Informaler
Informationsaustausch in den USA und Deutschland",  Die Betriebswirtschaft, 53: 589-
608.
35
Teece, J. D.(1986), "Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for Integration,
Cooperation, Licensing and Public Policy", Research Policy, 15:285-305.
Thorelli, H. (1986), "Networks: Between Markets and Hierarchies", Strategic Management
Journal, 7:37- 51.
Williamson, O. E. (1975), Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis of Antitrust Implications. Free Press:
New York.
Williamson, O. E. (1985), The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: The Free Press.
Williamson, O. E. (1989), "Transaction Cost Economics" in: Handbook of Industrial Organization,
Vol 2, ed R. Schmalensee and R. Willig. Amsterdam: North Holland.
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW), Institut für angewandte Sozialwissenschaft
(infas) (1994), Zukunftsperspektiven der deutschen Wirtschaft. Unternehmensbefragung
im Auftrag des Bundesministers für Forschung und Technologie (quoted:
"Questionnaire").
